Loading different pages in an iframe

[Fokke Nauta]

Things are not as simple as they might seem. Here is your page on my
screen when I am a bit tired and have to enlarge the text:

<http://dorayme.netweaver.com.au/justPics/fokke.jpg>

The fact is that if you are going to use tables for layout and want
something reasonably precise that does not break on other people's
computers and platforms and browsers, you need to be very careful about
dimensioning your boxes. You use pixels. Text grows to a different drum
beat.

I have checked it with IE, Firefox and Opera, they're all OK.
Chrome shows the same problem as you show. What browser did you use?

I have already seen what the problem is and I will work on that.

Thanks.

Fokke

 

[Beauregard T. Shagnasty]

I have checked it with IE, Firefox and Opera, they're all OK. Chrome
shows the same problem as you show. What browser did you use?

It doesn't matter what browser she (or anyone else) used. What matters
is if the visitor has, say, vision problems and needs to increase the
text size in order to read it, your design method falls apart.

Stop using tables for layout and pixels or points for font-sizing.

BODY {
FONT-SIZE: 10pt;
....

which is several points smaller than my default size (old guy with
glasses). Also, 'points' (pt) are for printing, not for browsers. Use
percentages instead (100%).

This may be the culprit; get something better.
<meta name="generator" content="Namo WebEditor v6.0">

 

[Bergamot]

I have checked it with IE, Firefox and Opera, they're all OK.

That's because those browsers do a page zoom by default. Your page
breaks when doing just text zoom, or if the browser's minimum font size
is larger than you accounted for.

 

[Ari Heino]

Fokke Nauta kirjoitti seuraavasti:

I noticed that it was the doctype that messed Firefox up.
I left out the doctype and now it worked well.
This is not the way it should, but for now it is best. I am working on it.

Stick to the doctype. Firefox didn't mess it up, it showed the page just
the way it should. The "problem" you were faced with were the new
margins, weren't they? You have to manipulate the margins of the
paragraphs, maybe set

td p {
margin: 0;
}

or something. You may need additional classes to avoid removing margins
where you want them to remain.

Better yet, try to use a list structure to make the navigation _list_,
not separate paragraphs.

BTW, you have quite a lot of redundancy in your css.

 

[Ari Heino]

Fokke Nauta kirjoitti seuraavasti:

Because Firefox messed up and I lost the scrollbar track transparency, I
left out the doctype again.
I know this is not correct but I don't know how to get it right with
Firefox.

Firefox does not support that kind of sh** err, properties.

Funny enough all the scrollbar arguments are incorrect.

They are proprietary stuff, not part of the official css standard.

However, they are used on professional websites. That's where I got them
from.

"Professional" sites tend to use lots of wacky stuff...

 

[dorayme]

The fact is that if you are going to use tables for layout and want
something reasonably precise that does not break on other people's
computers and platforms and browsers, you need to be very careful about
dimensioning your boxes. You use pixels. Text grows to a different drum
beat.

OK. So?[/QUOTE]

So boxes with fixed pixel dims run out of space to contain text that
grow with user decisions. Reminds me of a kid's picture story book about
a boy who brought a little dinosaur home. It grew out of pretty well
everything but the world itself. <g>

It is true that *table cells* (unlike some other elements) tend to grow
with content to *override* specified px dimensions.

(

Compare

<td style="width: 50px; height: 50px; border: 4px solid;"><img
src="pics/crimson.png" width="100" height="100" alt=""></td>

<div style="width: 50px; height: 50px; border: 4px solid;"><img
src="pics/crimson.png" width="100" height="100" alt=""></div>

)

But this does not help a layout that uses fixed spacer gifs in their own
cells, these feel no pressure to grow!

If you are going to use tables, get all the presentational stuff out
(for tidiness if for no other reason) and be very light with your CSS
for it. The magic of tables is the shrink and grow to fit content
quality of it, so beware of telling it how to behave too much. Let it do
the work for you and design accordingly.

 

[dorayme]

Unlike _all_ other elements (well, except the table rows and tables
containing those table cells).

OK. "Unlike most other elements" would have been a better phrase in the
context.

Perhaps my brain was unexpectedly captured by the limitations of
predicate logic: I think it was Frege (to whom, btw, we owe the
distinction between sense and reference) that introduced this
crystalline idea of "some" - as 'not none' into predicate logic. This
whole logic too, I think, he introduced into a scene that was a little
dry and rigid from the time of Aristotle (with sentential logic). With
predicate logic, Frege saw the way to look into sentences deeper.

 

[dorayme]

....

By the way, Russell does also talk about the "objective reference" of a
proposition (to a fact, "the objective"), not just about the reference
of an individual word.

One might say then that the objective referred to by a causal
proposition was a configuration of the landscape of possible worlds.

This would be one way of upholding the rule that every meaningful
proposition should have an objective to refer to.

There are two separate though not really unconnected issues in regards
to sentences that purport to claim something about the world. One issue
is how the sentence as a whole relates to the world. On this, the
relation is truth or falsity.

The other issue is how the parts relate to each other in relation to
what the sentence as a whole purports about the world and how the parts
themselves relate to the world (if they do).

....

But in that case what is the objective reference of a proposition like
"A causes B"? This looks like a candidate for a (pseudo-)problem that
would be (pseudo-)solved by saying possible worlds were real.

It seems to me to be confusing to talk about the reference of a
proposition or sentence purporting to be true. Names and definite
descriptions can have a reference in the clear sense of the objects
themselves being the references. We all know what it means to say "that
tree" refers to the tree itself. What could be more primitive than this?

However, the predicate "is true" said of sentences purporting to say
something about the world is simply true of the sentence if the world is
as it purports it to be and not if it is not. Nothing is added to the
idea of truth by saying the sentence has a reference.

In the final count, with causal statements, there is an interesting
question of whether we can see what can make them true beyond that
primitive instinct to suppose some sort of agency like we seem to have
when we make things happen.

But I don't know what Russell's take on that is. Real possible worlds
might be considered a metaphysical superstition.

I suspect he would be like everyone else and not really believe Lewis.
He was even unhappy and tried hard to be rid of universals and classes
from his ontology.

 

[dorayme]

....

...You wanted to say that there was
something real about causation, in the way that a real referent
corresponds to a reference, but not that any of the individual words in
a causal statement necessarily referred to it.

Yes, but not quite in the way that a definite description or name has a
reference. There is no object that can be pointed to. Saying A causes B
is saying something about the relation of A to B and that might involve
a lot of stuff (unlike the little that seems involved in the tree being
the reference of "That tree there")

A causes B. A and B refer to things, but "causes" doesn't, well not
literally in the way that A and B do-- I thought that was the kind of
thing you were saying. But the "objective reference" of the whole
proposition might be taken to be a configuration of the landscape of
possible worlds, without worrying for now about the individual words.

Yes, "might be taken", that is one theory of what the 'truth-maker' is.

1. A caused B

is looked at as roughly

2. If A had not happened, B would not have happened.

and 2 is then seen to have as its related 'fact' or 'truth maker'
particular features of possible worlds. Namely that the group of
possible worlds that are closest to ours except for A happening are also
worlds in which B does not happen.

And a lot of talking is needed to get people to take this seriously.
Lewis got serious philosophers' serious attention, no mean feat for such
a crazy sounding theory!

I can see why someone might want to do this if they wanted to uphold a
theory in which every meaningful proposition had to have an "objective
reference".

But you don't appear to obviously want to uphold any such theory, so
this can't be it.

I guess you are right. I think causal statements assume something about
how our world is constructed beyond things merely happening in Humean
regularities. Perhaps it is patterns all the way, but deeper patterns
than merely all the bricks we have dropped have always fallen. I am
probably closer to some of your own intuitions on this matter than you
think!

Perhaps a more fruitful approach to looking at causation is to step back
from trying to find correspondences of individual sentences with the
world and rather reflect on how scientific laws relate to the world in
other ways and then *later* come back to mop up about how individual
sentences relate.

Paul Davies is a physicist who has a philosophical bent and is to be
greatly respected for the way he keeps thinking and evolving his views.
He talks of looking at the world in terms of information theory, of the
laws as being somehow software and limited and tailored to the hardware.
You might find his evolution of view interesting, he is not a
professional philosopher but I like that he knows a lot of physics.

<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/scienceshow/stories/2006/1809842.htm>

Click "Show transcript" and scan down past all of the interview with
Dawkins... There is a podcast on it too...

Yes, although it just moves the problem to the question which worlds are
possible and why. There might only be one possible world anyway.

I very much like the idea that there is only one possible world and that
what happens necessarily happens and it is an illusion somehow that
anything can be different to the way it is. But making this out is
another matter. <g>