B
Brian
The end of a paragraph is the place where my wife can interrupt me.
No, wait: she doesn't need paragraphs...
Brian
No, wait: she doesn't need paragraphs...
Brian
D
dorayme
Now that is not a bad way of identifying a paragraph! If it is not whatBrian <[email protected]> said:
I have said it is, and is instead some weirdo abstract spooky beast,
then the causal effects on wives is an option as a criterion.
If you notice carefully, there is probably a difference in the *way* she
interrupts you at different times. There are probably sentence, comma,
paragraph interrupting ways. In my case I have noticed that I am
interrupted as I go to speak. This, I suppose is the causal effect of
nothing and as such, is very interesting to me. Perhaps the proposition
that the world had a cause and the theory of the Big Bang are not
incompatible after all...
D
dorayme
People perhaps used to do this rather effortlessly before the turn ofBen C said:
the 19th into the 20th centuries.
All sorts of people are confused about identity. It was almost gospel,
to take a notorious example, until the 1970s that the mind could not be
the brain. First year philosophy students were regularly taught to
dispatch the idea that these two things could be one and the same. It
was considered a logical or conceptual mistake. The perpetrators of this
disservice to anti-dualist thinking are never quite silenced but they
took a big hit when the distinction I have been describing became better
known to them. The scale of the trouble caused by a failure to
appreciate this distinction is big indeed.
Not sure what you are asking. I have given examples of phrases that have
references. And I have generally extended the idea for this thread into
all elements of sentences that point to features in the non-linguistic
world.
What use would it be for the detective to say
1. The man going into the flat where the blonde lives is your husband
if the various bits did not have references. You are welcome to use
"referents". The words are not important. What is important is that
things in the real world are being pointed to. It is a basic feature of
our using language. To pick out things in the world to say things about
them. To pick things out and say what the real relations between them
(non-linguistic relations) are.
When we start talking about causal relations, there must be something
about the world that makes one thing cause another. If it is not some
gluey spooky thing then it is something more complicated about how the
world really is. Scientists can tell us a great deal about these things.
But when the scientists are done, there are a few questions still. Hume
had some. Many of us have some. It is shear human curiosity to ask
questions. All I can tell you is that a great deal of confusion can
result from not distinguishing meaning from reference. I am not saying
that you cannot look into this distinction more closely.
No, no... <g>. No particular women are being identified here.
2. There are no blond women in the flat
is saying that there is a particular flat (note the 'the') about which
it is not true that it has a certain characteristic. It could as well be
"has no working toilet".
If you are curious like Hume and many of us, yes! We want to know what,
outside our sentences and our minds, is the causal bit about.
I did try to formulate the query that remains when the scientists have
finished their jobs when I asked about "What is common to A causes B for
all the many different values that fill these variables?" and went on to
summarise a few answers, including Hume's
We can step back at any time here and get less complex. What is a causal
relation in the world? What more is it than something going with
something else? Hume found nothing. I think a complicated story needs to
be told that makes Hume anything but actually right. Lewis tells a
story. Someone can choose not to tell stories but then how is this
different from either a lack of curiosity or a view of the primitiveness
of the causal relation (a bit like, what is it for something to *exist*
- on this I happen not to be further curious because I know nothing
clearer than this with which to investigate it.)
3. All bachelors are unmarried
Although, no matter what the circumstances, it is not asserting a
definition, I am not disputing that one might use it as an example in an
English language class. It is used often by philosophers as an example
of something true in order to discuss what makes it true and how it is
to be distinguished from many other types of sentences. Philosophers are
particularly nosey about necessity, both in maths and elsewhere.
You seem to think 3. is something a bit useless. No doubt you are right
in this particular case. But what if there are interesting necessary
statements? Maths. Other things. It is an open question how analytic
these are. It is indeed an open question what quite is the distinction
between analytic and synthetic and how these categories cut across the
necessary/contingent one.
But we are not talking these things so why are they being discussed
here? We are talking causal truths. The answer to your questions about
such analytic truths, supposing we had some detailed ones, might turn
out not to be relevant to what we are discussing.
What can I say that I have not already said? Everything important is
what is left. We can talk till the cows come home about meaning. But in
the end, there are questions about the world itself. Hume, I keep
mentioning him because you have a familiarity with him, was interested
in more than the meaning of words. I think this is a fine tradition and
however I admire Wittgentein, I do not think like his disciples thought,
that philosophy is about clearing up conceptual confusions by attending
to our language.
Why would you say or think this? What is common between two things in
the world outside language is in the world outside language, it is not
something in language. And most certainly is not to do with just grammar.
I am not disputing that sentences are true because of both the meanings
of the words and the way the world is. But we do make a distinction. And
causal relations between matches and fire are not part of our language,
they are part of the world outside language.
If you don't agree that the world does not have a nature in respect of A
causing B, then how is this different to denying that A caused B?
4. A caused B
is true because something in the world makes it true and it ain't that A
and B are hanging around looking pretty. And, not believing Hume, I
think it is something more than that B follows A.
It is easy to suppose that if you are not happy with what scientists say
about A and B and ask further questions, you must be asking about
meaning or grammar or concepts. But this is a deep mistake and a bad
legacy from Wittgenstein later writings.
The answer to these concerns about causality lies in more than mere
meaning or grammar, it lies in a good look at human theory building and
human representation of the world and ultimately what the best theory
about the world is.
I would not have said so. I am quite happy to discuss only those
sentences that never fail to have references. Look at 4 above. I am
saying we get nowhere by peering closely at the meaning of the phrases
to identify A or B and we get no real knowledge by asking what do we
mean (English mean) by "caused". What we do get by the latter is further
semantic equivalences. I have argued that the counterfactuals are
crucial in this. That is the meaning part done. The rest is about the
references, about the world out there. The counterfactual version of the
meaning obviously sets the stage for a theory about what is out there
that has tempted the other worlds hypothesis.
I concede that the world out there might include features about human
theory building activities but this something, by no stretch of the
imagination, can be called examining the meaning of our English words.
Formalism? He goes into things. He tries to be as rigorous as possible.
We have not been discussing modal logic here.
It would be a funny thing if something alleged to be true about the
world turned out to be true but nothing in the world made it true. That
is not something I can imagine even as magic.
That is a nice quote! I wonder how many of us have felt a bit this way?
<g>
J
Jan Faerber
And nowadays we have only paragraphs anymore:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitespace_(programming_language)
J
Jan Faerber
And the climax is Power Point?
Sorry - no cynical comment. Just came to my mind.
I know ... Rosetta Stone and roman steles - there was not much space
on it.
D
dorayme
Ben C said:
I am happy to agree that names and definite descriptions refer to things
in many of the true sentences with which we have been dealing. And happy
to say that what is said *about* these things do not point to *objects*
in the world but are simply characteristics of the objects pointed to by
the names and definite descriptions. What is said about objects can be
simple or complex, from "is 4-ft long" to "is midway between Saturn and
Neptune" to... you name it.
It is still the case that one can describe, for the purpose of
reference, an object in causal terms:
1. The cause of the carnage was the bomb placed under the chassis by Mr
X.
Something - the cause of the carnage - is being 'definitely described'
here. This is a technical term meaning it is a phrase that acts rather
like a name with assumptions or pretensions to be picking out some
unique thing in the world, yes, an object, a thing, as in "The man going
into that flat" in
2. The man going into that flat was your husband
And it - The cause of the carnage - is being claimed to be identical
with something else - the bomb placed under the chassis by Mr X - that
is being definitely described also. An identity statement. The very sort
that I used in describing the distinction between sense and reference.
The terms have a sense and they have a reference. I have been urging
that we are okay with the sense. No huge problem here. That is English,
that is meaning, that is the language, that is how we speak and how we
use words. Fine. The really interesting question is what is being picked
out in the non-linguistic world. In the case of the description in 2.
there is no immediate problem. The detective knows what he saw, simple
as that. He knows what sort of thing walked into the blonde's flat, he
knows it was just one man, he noted the time. His definite description
is fashioned in a particular context, it can be filled out a little
more, but it is pretty clear in its meaning or sense. And we are not
having trouble understanding how it can have a reference (call it a
referent if you want) here.
But in the case of 1, there is a sticky problem and it is not different
to the one Hume discussed when all is said and done. Questions arise
about how such a thing in the world is to be identified in such terms
('the cause of the carnage'). How is such a thing to be distinguished
from the bomb itself? Some people would say, by it being true that if
the bomb had not been clamped under the chassis (e.g.. had it been
clamped under a different car in a different street), the reference
would then fail.
I trust we can deal with all quibbles. And, yes, we are going in
circles. But that is the nature of this game. I keep coming back to
counterfactuals because I was not kidding when I said it is pretty hard
to understand causality without using them.
Exactly! For one moment I had to come to realise that you are saying
this and not me! This is what I am saying about the causal relation,
something in the world seems to be needed to make it true. I have been
asking what that might be. I have been keenly putting it every which way
I can think of to you. And while we have journeyed here and there, the
question still remains. What in the world outside of language and us is
cause.
Perhaps nothing! Perhaps, indeed, we need to look not to spooky causal
glue, not to counterfactual worlds, not to complicated stories about
possibilities in combinations of universals in this world, but to us and
our minds?
It is interesting that you should put the point about 'in the mind'.
There was a famous philosopher who thought we brought big frameworks to
the world from our minds - space, time, causality. I did hint at this
when I said a story might need to be told in terms of human theory
building. It may well turn out that there is nothing we can ever really
settle on to identify as a truth-maker in the world to ground the
relations we claim in our sentences. It may be a complicated story about
how our minds need to organise our experiences in this way.
I would be the last to deny this. But I do not have a picture of
philosophy as some sort of muddle clearing house. I am old fashioned and
believe in metaphysics.
D
dorayme
I would not, no.Ben C said:
To some extent the idea of mind is heavily theory laden and to the
extent that some of these theories are wrong or worse, I would say we do
not, in fact, have minds. But, of course, we do! In other words, there
is something hard and sensible in our thinking from the last few
thousand years.
Capturing this harder more sensible thing: Our minds are things. They
are things that have mental states. We are pretty sure we have minds.
Now, things do not have meaning. Words and phrases and linguistic
objects do. Our brains are things. The idea of the contingent identity
theory is that minds and brains are in fact the same thing. The
reference of the phrase "X's mind" is something in the world. So too is
the reference of "X's brain" There are not too references (feel free to
use 'referent'). The claim is that there is just one. The sense or
meaning of the terms are different. Remember:
1. The man going into the flat above at 2 am was your husband.
The meaning of "The man going into the flat above at 2 am" is different
to the meaning of "your husband". But they both refer, if the detective
is right, to one and the same thing.
Neither 1. nor
2. Mr X's mind is Mr X's brain
is a necessary truth.
I do sympathise with you saying that we should look to science to
explain how things cause other things. But suppose we stop at what they
tell us and go home. Don't you realise what that would mean? It would
mean Ed and others would breath far too big a sigh of relief at this
thread! <g>
Seriously, don't you think there is *any* question left to ask about
cause after the scientists have their say? What about Hume's questions?
What about the question about what makes a counterfactual true?
A scientist is quite likely to say when we probe a bit, at one point:
2. Well, er... had Mr X not smoked, he would be alive today
And we might say to him, "mmm... what do you know about what what would
have happened to him if he had not smoked? Have you got him not smoking
in your lab somewhere and not dying?"
"Well", the scientist says, "we have observed people like him that do
not smoke and don't die at his age".
"But that is not Mr X! We are talking about Mr X and why *he* died, not
people *like him*...", we might protest.
You can see how things can deteriorate quickly. There will be
inquisitive folk (like Hume) who will comment acidly on the matter. They
will see the scientist as telling us about the observed regularities.
And they will ask if that is all it is. Some will say yes, that is it.
There is no more to A causes B than B regularly being observed to follow
A. Or some such thing.
I think, if we are curious, we can do very much better.
The story is supposed to identify a truth maker for counterfactual
statements. No one else seemed to be doing the job well up to the point
he offered his theory.
I am trying my best in the format that usenet allows! said:
Well, some feel the need to identify in some way what makes a
counterfactual true. You agree that that they can be true but seem
unmoved by the idea that something in the world makes them true. You
seem comfortable with less metaphysical theory and others are thirsty
for more and better.
I would settle for some account of why we are barking up the wrong tree
here. Maybe there is a Kantian sort of story to be told about humans
bringing causality in as a framework and imposing it. But imposing it on
what? A series of regularities that are truly out there.
This idea rather depresses me! It speaks of a race locked in a mental
prison where there is no real escape.
At least for the reason that you are saying something in addition to
picking out objects
3. If I had got there earlier I would have read the newspaper.
makes *a claim about* these undoubted things, you, earlier times and
newspapers.
D
dorayme
....
Much wisdom in that. Let us set curiosity about metaphysical questions
aside and await the future. <g>
....
Much wisdom in that. Let us set curiosity about metaphysical questions
aside and await the future. <g>
....
D
dorayme
Ben C said:
We can indeed say this. Just as we can say 'The man going into that
flat' refers to 'your husband' in 2 above. The reference of both are
one and the same. The reference of 'The cause...' in 1. is the same as
'the bomb placed under the chassis...'
There is no trouble about this in the sense of picking out the object.
The trouble comes in what it is about the object and its relations in
the world outside us that makes it a cause, ultimately what in the world
could account for the identity statement being true.
It fails for the same reason that
3. The King Of France is bald
fails in its reference. There is no such monarch and in the situation we
are *envisaging* there is no bomb clamped under your car.
the sense of the words in the example was about the flat itself owned
and generally occupied by the blonde woman, do we need to go into
whether she was actually in the flat when he went in? Maybe she nicked
out to get a nice cake?
We are talking cases where there is no failure to refer in fact. The
sticky wicket about the causal statement is that it seems to involve
counterfactuals. What would have happened had some things not been the
way they were?
D
dorayme
Ben C said:
'the cause of the carnage' is an attempt at reference. If it succeeds,
it picks out the cause of the carnage. If the cause happens to be the
bomb, the reference will be the bomb.
Your "just" is slightly misplaced or misleading. If the detective tells
his client that her husband is not only the man that entered the blonde
woman's flat but that he is "just the man that 3 years ago had been
caught climbing through the window of a neighbour of his estranged
father and stealing 14 rare stamps", there is no *just* about it.
Descriptions carry a conceptual load that is separate from mere
reference. And it is not mere meaning. The meaning of the words is one
thing. The implications are another. The implications of the referring
phrase tell of a bigger story than the mere reference to the featherless
biped that walked into that blonde's flat.
So too of the phrase 'the cause'. It is conceptually rich. There is no
*just* about it.
It is this richness, these implications about the world that is the real
subject of curiosity.
OK. Let's sort out an issue here. The above comes from my:
"1. The cause of the carnage was the bomb placed under the chassis by Mr
X.
....
"... in the case of 1, there is a sticky problem and it is not different
to the one Hume discussed when all is said and done. Questions arise
about how such a thing in the world is to be identified in such terms
('the cause of the carnage'). How is such a thing to be distinguished
from the bomb itself? Some people would say, by it being true that if
the bomb had not been clamped under the chassis (e.g.. had it been
clamped under a different car in a different street), the reference
would then fail."
I was referring here to the envisaged counterfactual situation in
respect to 'the bomb placed under the chassis by Mr X' and not to 'cause
of the carnage'.
If I say:
1. The cause of the carnage is the bomb made by Mr X.
and it happens that Mr X put this bomb quite elsewhere, the reference of
'cause of the carnage' does not fail. In fact it cannot fail in this
world of ours. There would have been a cause for the carnage. It is just
that it is not identical to the bomb we are talking about.
However, if it was the bomb we are talking about that did cause the
carnage then the cause is the bomb.
....
....
On this distinction between meaning and reference, I am starting to feel
a bit guilty at possibly misleading you? Perhaps I should have been more
careful in how I introduced it or what I said about it?
It is an important distinction generally to keep in mind and illustrates
how we must watch out for when we are talking about language itself
somehow and when about the world apart from language. It crops up all
the time when looking at various statements. It comes up, as we have
seen, in various causal statements. But I am not meaning to say that
whenever the word "cause" occurs in a sentence about the world, there is
some object or simple feature that it must match in some simple
referential way.
In one sense, I wanted to show you this distinction to illustrate the
simple point that we can be happy about the meaning of our words without
necessarily knowing what some phrases actually refer to. That meaning
was something we learn with the language, but reference is the
particular interest of scientists and philosophers (other than those
unduly influenced by the later Wittgenstein).
The puzzle about cause is to think what more than mere regularity a la
Hume could be involved. You say you trust to science in the future for
an answer.
Perhaps we will look at all this stuff in a very different way when we
know more about how evolved creatures like us can represent the world
outside their brains.
In the meantime, we do the best we can. And it does seem that causal
statements involve the truth of counterfactuals. And so an account of
how counterfactuals can be true is something that anyone keen on this
issue needs to address.
D
dorayme
....
You put it very well!
This idea of conceptual richness is something I have only introduced in
the last post or so in order to answer a couple of things you said.
Allow me to make it more transparent. It is nothing spooky. I mean only
refer to assumptions built into definite descriptions.
Take the definite description in:
1. The man who broke into his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's
house in 1999 is your husband.
I have said how the meaning of 'The man who broke into his father's
stamp-collecting neighbour's house in 1999' is one thing and the
reference is another in the technical sense that English speakers know
how to use the long phrase repeatedly, in other sentences and to refer
to other men in the world or even to fail to refer to anyone. The
*reference*, however, is simply the thing in the world picked out.
However if you look at the definite description 'The man who broke into
his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's house in 1999' it cannot
escape notice that there are assumptions lying behind the use of it.
Assumptions about how the world is. One assumption is that there is a
father to the reference (use 'referent' if you feel more comfortable),
this father has a neighbour, this neighbour collects stamps, the
collection is partly at least in the neighbour's house and so on. These
assumptions are not being asserted in 1. They lie behind 1, as it were.
Sure, 'The man who broke into his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's
house in 1999' has a meaning and is intended in 1. to refer to a
specific thing. But coming along for the ride is a whole lot of other
assumptions, all of which need to be true (more or less true, there are
some esoteric exceptions, but let's keep it simple).
These assumptions are important. If they are not the least bit true,
then the main business of successfully referring cannot get going. Now
this applies to the idea of cause in the following way:
2. The cause of the carnage was the bomb made by Mr. X
speaks of a cause, it speaks of a specific cause, it refers but it
carries the assumption that there is something of specific character
here in the world.
Now I would say that this character is something to do with an
assumption that had there *not* been some important thing in the
situation that was in fact in the situation, the carnage would not have
occurred.
Hello, here is that counterfactual popping up again! Every time I do
this, you run out on to the road and stick up a big STOP sign. I wait
patiently, the engine running, for you to let me pass. But you keep
popping up at other points of my travel... <g>
So, we come to Lewis and your below...
Lewis tried to answer the question 'What makes a counterfactual true?'.
He posits worlds in which there *are* ways that are different to our
world and this provides the 'categorical' (if you like) truth-maker. You
are not alone in thinking this story he tells is unconvincing. He was
alone, the poor guy, in thinking it. I have almost infinite respect for
him. It was not a game. He was honestly asking questions and following
leads as best and as honestly and bravely as he could. What Wittgenstein
said needs to be taken with large grains of salt.
Well, the ontological argument, depending on the version you mean, is a
faulty argument and faulty for reasons I cannot see as relevant here.
But I do see one thing, statements about a god carry all sorts of
assumptions. And when you examine these assumptions, you get some pretty
unbelievable, preposterous stuff. I trust that causation fares better.
Remember that we can get by easily without assertions about gods. But we
cannot get by without counterfactuals. They are part of every thought
about ways the world could have been different. Not least when
reflecting on our own behaviour.
You put it very well!
This idea of conceptual richness is something I have only introduced in
the last post or so in order to answer a couple of things you said.
Allow me to make it more transparent. It is nothing spooky. I mean only
refer to assumptions built into definite descriptions.
Take the definite description in:
1. The man who broke into his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's
house in 1999 is your husband.
I have said how the meaning of 'The man who broke into his father's
stamp-collecting neighbour's house in 1999' is one thing and the
reference is another in the technical sense that English speakers know
how to use the long phrase repeatedly, in other sentences and to refer
to other men in the world or even to fail to refer to anyone. The
*reference*, however, is simply the thing in the world picked out.
However if you look at the definite description 'The man who broke into
his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's house in 1999' it cannot
escape notice that there are assumptions lying behind the use of it.
Assumptions about how the world is. One assumption is that there is a
father to the reference (use 'referent' if you feel more comfortable),
this father has a neighbour, this neighbour collects stamps, the
collection is partly at least in the neighbour's house and so on. These
assumptions are not being asserted in 1. They lie behind 1, as it were.
Sure, 'The man who broke into his father's stamp-collecting neighbour's
house in 1999' has a meaning and is intended in 1. to refer to a
specific thing. But coming along for the ride is a whole lot of other
assumptions, all of which need to be true (more or less true, there are
some esoteric exceptions, but let's keep it simple).
These assumptions are important. If they are not the least bit true,
then the main business of successfully referring cannot get going. Now
this applies to the idea of cause in the following way:
2. The cause of the carnage was the bomb made by Mr. X
speaks of a cause, it speaks of a specific cause, it refers but it
carries the assumption that there is something of specific character
here in the world.
Now I would say that this character is something to do with an
assumption that had there *not* been some important thing in the
situation that was in fact in the situation, the carnage would not have
occurred.
Hello, here is that counterfactual popping up again! Every time I do
this, you run out on to the road and stick up a big STOP sign. I wait
patiently, the engine running, for you to let me pass. But you keep
popping up at other points of my travel... <g>
So, we come to Lewis and your below...
Lewis tried to answer the question 'What makes a counterfactual true?'.
He posits worlds in which there *are* ways that are different to our
world and this provides the 'categorical' (if you like) truth-maker. You
are not alone in thinking this story he tells is unconvincing. He was
alone, the poor guy, in thinking it. I have almost infinite respect for
him. It was not a game. He was honestly asking questions and following
leads as best and as honestly and bravely as he could. What Wittgenstein
said needs to be taken with large grains of salt.
Well, the ontological argument, depending on the version you mean, is a
faulty argument and faulty for reasons I cannot see as relevant here.
But I do see one thing, statements about a god carry all sorts of
assumptions. And when you examine these assumptions, you get some pretty
unbelievable, preposterous stuff. I trust that causation fares better.
Remember that we can get by easily without assertions about gods. But we
cannot get by without counterfactuals. They are part of every thought
about ways the world could have been different. Not least when
reflecting on our own behaviour.
J
Jan Faerber
O believe me Ed, do I know this! With my antennae, I sense glowering
eyes, murmurings and rumblings among the senators, plans set for some
sort of Ides of March.
May I recommend a filter for you - just for the thread mind you - unless
you are secretly fascinated by the spectacle. It takes courage Ed, but
you can do it.
However, be warned Ed, I have a FREE and UNCONDITIONAL OFFER planned for
later where you could be the LUCKY WINNER of a ROUND TRIP OF THE EARTH
AND MORE for you and your family, all 5 STAR. You would MISS OUT.
[/QUOTE]
I still don't know if I should install Vista Business, Windows 2000
or Debian, SuSe & Co.
All I do in the last few days is to install Win - Lux - Win - Linux -
Win - Linux
For Apple cross me out.
I just don't know what to do.
I could sell shit in little boxes.
D
dorayme
Ben C said:
That was not a problem to me. I appreciated it. said:
Indeed! Your summing up reminds me a bit of my image of you constantly
jumping out with a stop sign as I try to get ahead on some road or
other. Perhaps the road is just a giant loop anyway... said:
Yes, I can see.
You may find this interesting: http://tinyurl.com/co332z
Very biased of course, but lots about the history I didn't know, and
full of glimpses of the strange and wonderful things on the other side
of the fence (which I still don't believe in by the way.
These are large issues. I greatly disagree with him and his
understanding of the modern era after Wittgenstein and Strawson.
Anyway, if you ever get suddenly outraged by some claim or other made in
this thread, or have any further thoughts, you are most welcome to air
them.