and black is white and pigs can fly. This is arrant nonsense.
different specifics does not necessarily mean a different model.
yeah right. Are there a lot of forced abortions in America to enforce
the One Child policy? Just how big was the leader of China's majority
in the last election?
The US has its problems but this sort of moral relativism from useful
idiots just takes the biscuit.
a difference in laws doesn't necessarily mean difference in morals.
who ever says that public opinion influencing an election is a "moral
right"?...
why not just say "a government can make whatever laws they figure best
benefit the nation"?...
people can then oppose them if they want, or follow them, and there is no
particular fault either way.
and the country has not imploded either politically or economically, so they
can't be doing things "THAT" badly, even if one may disagree with things
like the one child policy, public humiliation or executions, labor camps,
....
(granted, I don't strictly agree with all of their policies, but they can't
be so easily disproven either...).
<snip>
it is assumed here that rightness and wrongness arise from evaluations (this
"moral calculus"), otherwise one would have to assume intrinsic values
(problematic, since one can't demonstrate that intrinsic values exist), or a
nihilistic position (I was faced with this for a while, but came up with a
model which could at least mostly hold together).
anyways, a universalist model can seem relative in some cases, such as if it
allows evaluation from many possible sources at the same time, which can
likely account for many of the variations seen between societies without
otherwise breaking the underlying model.
not everyone is happy, and wars/conflicts/... are inevitable, but this may
be a tradeoff...
the US doesn't have the same laws, because they don't have the same overall
societal or political architecture.
anyways, I don't claim to either support humanistic ideals, or to believe in
a strict absolutist mindset (where a difference in large-scale architecture
would pose a problem), so the exact manifestation may allow some variation
while still preserving the relevant aspects.
for example: in my case, neither preservation of life, nor preservation of
personal freedoms, nor presevation of happiness or wellbeing, ..., are
axioms (for sake of a consistent model, intrinsic values were avoided, and
most values were made extrinsic, or IOW, manifesting in a manner similar to
economic properties...).
for example, how does one prove that the life of a person has value in
itself?... really, if it is assumed that a person is possibly (simply) just
matter, then little is contained in their structure to give this value.
something else is then needed to give them such value, and this may be in
effect, their relations to and interactions with others, and with external
systems. then, they can have value, without needing to depend on the
existence of non-demonstratable properties.
however, they may still be present, for example, due to not being required
to enforce ones' views on others, and it being to a net detriment to oppose
them. so, for example, one preserves personal rights, not because there is
inherent value in personal rights, but because it works out to the greater
benefit for everyone involved.
and, if another can derive greater benefit by opposing ones' rights, that is
valid as well.
the cost then is if someone does something which is, in all cases, a
detriment to those involved.
it is these things which can be opposed.
it is much like how the same piece of code may be used in all manner of
codebases without otherwise compromising its functionality...
granted, yes, the model still has a few faults and questionable edge
cases...